Thursday 1 April 2021

Alex Salmond as The Great Independence Strategist

 I have been writing articles, columns and Blogs for over 50 years. On only two occasions did Alex Salmond figure as the main or only subject; the first when I did a summary of his first leadership term for my Spectator Column with the Perthshire Advertiser. The second occasion was when I wrote in my Spectator Blog, "If Scots Vote NO Blame Alex Salmond" This was written in the aftermath of his debate with Alistair Darling prior to the Referendum on Independence in 2014. I argued that his obsession with forcing the Westminster Government to agree to a Currency Union with an "Independent" Scotland would create confusion among Scots voters, leading to uncertainty over the ability of an "Independent" Scotland's ability to run its economy. And so it proved as the vast majority of Scots, including those in the SNP who backed Salmond's demand for a Currency Union, failed to understand that had a Currency Union been granted, Scotland would not have been independent as London would have continued to control Scotland's economy. Salmond's claim that what was more important was Fiscal Autonomy made his claims even more ludicrous, particularly as he worked as an "oil economist" with the Royal Bank.

What prompts this latest blog is the creation of the new political party Alba and the repeated claim that Alex Salmond is a political strategist with a political record second to none, in his pursuit of Scottish Independence. For a start, I do not believe Salmond actually wants independence, having supported the imposition of Independence in Europe at the SNP Annual Conference in 1988, he has been a strong supporter of membership of the EU ever since, despite the ever increasing centralisation of the EU through the Luxembourg Agreement abolishing the veto in the important areas of government, the Single European Act, Maastricht and the setting up of the euro. SNP members who still maintain that membership of the EU, including the single currency, does not affect Scottish independence, resolutely refuse to explain HOW members of the EU retain their independence. I have pursued SNP leaders and members over a number of years, from Nicola Sturgeon down, to give that explanation only to be met by a wall of silence. But my cynicism of Salmond's commitment to Independence goes back further than 1988,

When I demitted office as Deputy Leader I retained my place on the NEC and, as a member of the Election Committee which was responsible for the vetting and training of those who wanted to be included on the party's candidate's list, I interviewd Salmond in 1984. We put candidates under pressure, putting questions to them they were likely to meet if they were ever adopted for a parliamentary constituency. I put it to Salmond, "If you could be certain that Scotland would be worse off under Independence, would you still be a Nationalist?" I put that question to every candidate just to see how they would handle it because the question of Scotland's ability to "afford" Independence was the most common objection to Independence they were likely to face. As my own position was well known, as someone who wanted Independence for its own sake and not based on the question of affordability or economics, candidates were normally cautious about how they answered. Salmond replied, "I don't think I could be as definite as you. That is something I would have to consider." He was the only potential candidate EVER to give that answer.

Salmond always saw his great strength in publicity and he was elected to the office of Vice Chairman for Publicity in 1985. At the Annual Conference in 1986 he launched his "big idea" of the pact with Plaid Cymru. This relied on the notion that the next election - probably 1987 - would result in a hung parliament, "If Westminster should have a hung parliament, let it hang by a Scottish rope" became the campaign slogan. He advocated the pact with Plaid should offer to keep Labour in power in order to deny the Tories under Thatcher, another term in office. For that to be a realistic option the Labour Party would have had to be in a position where it was relatively close to the Tories in the previous General Election in 1983. The actual result in 1983 gave the Tories a majority of 144. Was the situation in Scotland any more likely to persuade Scots that the Salmond strategy could work. The 1983 election had been a disaster for the SNP which returned two MPs, Gordon Wilson and Donnie Stewart and polled only 11.8% of the popular vote. Nevertheless Salmond forecast that we would take at least seven Tory seats and that the greatest victories would be between the Tay and Moray Firth.

But what about the Labour vote in Scotland? How would the Salmond strategy go down in the Labour heartlands of West Central Scotland? If the SNP's election campaign was to push the idea that Labour would come so close to winning in the rest of the UK, as to create a hung parliament situation, would that not encourage Scots sympathetic to Labour in any case, to be all the more likely to vote for them in the hope of winning throughout the UK? That thought never seemed to enter Salmond's mind is the generous interpretation of his lack of overall strategy. It could also be claimed he was not concerned about the potential Labour vote in Scotland and how it would effect fellow SNP candidates who were contesting in Labour held seats, after all he was contesting the Tory held Banff and Buchan seat. In the event the Labour Party in Scotland won another nine seats, taking them to a total of 50 with an increased share of the vote of 7.3% to a total of 42.4%, while the SNP won three Tory held seats, increasing their share of the vote by 2.3% to 14.1% and losing Dundee East and Western Isles in the process, both to Labour. My article in the SI, "You Were Warned", written in the aftermath of that election sums up just what a disaster the Salmond strategy was for the SNP as a whole.The Tories won the election with a majority of 102.

 


Salmond supporters claim with justification, that he was responsible for getting Cameron to agree to a Scottish Referendum in 2014. What they tend to forget, he also agreed to a Section 30, thereby agreeing that Westminster should have the final say on whther Scots can hold referenda in the future. That was a complete surrender of Scottish sovereignty and still haunts the current SNP government to this day. His "once in a generation" comment, meant no doubt as an encouragement to Scots to come out and vote, has been hijacked by the Unionist opposition in a most ludicrous and dishonest fashion. One would have thought that would have taught him a lesson but, true to his customary short termism and fondness for the smart comment, he has now saddled the Independence Movement with his latest gaffe, the "Supermajority" needed to justify Independence. What is a "Supermajority" and how many seats does it mean? No doubt the Unionists will tell us shortly. Salmond may have been instrumental in getting the Cameron Government to agree to the 2014 Referendum but he then destroyed any possibility of  Scots voting "Yes" with his obsession with the Currency Union, thereby insisting that London should continue to control the Scottish economy. He more than anyone, destroyed any chance the Independence Movement had of winning that referendum.

We will have to see whether or not Alba will continue to seek membership of the EU or attempt to fudge the issue by suggesting EFTA. If it suggests membership of the EEA, Scots will still be subject to EU regulations but it will no doubt continue to be sold to the Scottish electorate as "Independence". Alex Salmond may be many things, but a strategist is most definitely not one of them.

ENDS